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1601 
“CHŌSAKAN”: RESEARCH JUDGES TOILING AT 
THE STONE FORTRESS 
MASAKO KAMIYA

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We know that they are there, but, unlike law clerks at the United States 
Supreme Court,
1
 not much has been written
2
 about our ―courtiers‖3 to the 
Supreme Court of Japan: saikō saibansho chōsakan. 
To avoid confusion and to indicate who they really are, ―saikō 
saibansho chōsakan‖ should be translated as ―research judges at the 
Supreme Court.‖ According to Article 57 of the Judiciary Act of 1947:  
(1) ―Chōsakan‖ will be assigned to the Supreme Court, high courts, 
and district courts. 
 
 
  Professor, Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University. I would like to thank all the participants at 
the ―Decision Making on the Japanese Supreme Court‖ symposium, especially David Law. I am very 
grateful to those research judges, past and present, who agreed to talk about their work as research 
judges. They remain anonymous as I have promised. Needless to say, all errors are mine. 
 1. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & 
DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES (2006). 
 2. The single insider’s information (i.e., written by a ―chōsakan‖ himself of ―chōsakan‖) that is 
published, as far as I am aware, is HIROHARU KITAGAWA, Saikōsaibansho chōsakan seido ni tsuite 
[On Research Judges at the Supreme Court], in KON-NICHI NO SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO: GENTEN TO GENTEN 
[THE SUPREME COURT TODAY: ORIGINS AND THE PRESENT] 110–15 (Hōgaku Seminar Special Issue 
1988). Kitagawa had been a chief research judge, see infra notes 5, 15 and accompanying text, from 
May 1990 to December 1994; a senior research judge, see infra notes 5, 17 and accompanying text, 
from April 1983 to March 1988; and a research judge from 1970 to 1972. He also served as an 
associate Justice from September 1998 to December 2004. Takuji Kurata, a retired judge, has written a 
series of autobiographical essays, Saibankan no sengo shi [A Postwar History of a Judge], infra note 
31, which includes his days as a chōsakan from 1959 to 1963. On reading his essays, one cannot avoid 
feeling that these were the idyllic days long gone. Another source also offers a brief explanation of 
what research judges do. TSUGIO NAKANO ET AL., HANREI NO YOMIKATA [JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND 
HOW TO READ IT] 99–100 (3d ed. 2009). When this book, written by a group of very respected judges 
and stating that judicial precedent is a source of law that is binding upon judges in Japan, was first 
published in 1986, it was a shocking pronouncement that Japan was slowly but steadily drifting from a 
civil-law country toward a case-law jurisdiction. TSUGIO NAKANO ET AL., HANREI NO YOMIKATA 
[JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND HOW TO READ IT] 14 (1st ed. 1986). Apart from David J. Danelski’s forty-
year-old article, The Supreme Court of Japan: An Exploratory Study, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOUR: CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE EAST AND WEST 
132–37 (Glendon Schubert & David J. Danelski eds., 1969), Hiroshi Itoh’s monography might be the 
only available source of information on chosakan available in English at the moment. HIROSHI ITOH, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND BENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN 57–64 (2010). 
 3. See PEPPERS, supra note 1. 
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(2) ―Chōsakan‖ will engage in research necessary for trial and 
adjudication of a case as instructed by judges (at district court level, 
―chōsakan‖ will only deal with intellectual properties and tax 
cases), and other matters provided in other laws.
4
  
In 2010, there were thirty-seven research judges
5
 working at the 
Supreme Court. These are judges with at least ten years’ experience, some 
with over twenty years’ experience at ordinary law courts (i.e., trial or 
appellate experience), who are assigned by the Supreme Court to this 
position. They are distinctively different from other ―chōsakans‖ at 
various other courts mentioned in Article 57 who are not necessarily, and 
usually not, judges. They are definitely not freshly graduated law school 
students recruited by Justices themselves. Yet, they appear to perform 
functions at the court similar to those performed by American law 
clerks—or do they?  
One of the supplementary provisions to Article 57 further provides that 
the Supreme Court will assign, whenever necessary, judges and 
prosecutors as ―shihō kenshūjo kyokan,‖ instructors at the Legal Research 
and Training Institute (LRTI), and judges as ―chōsakan,‖ for the time 
being.
6
 
Justice Kitagawa indicates the possibility that the American law clerk 
system might have had some influence upon the initial plan to establish 
―chōsakan‖ because, in the first draft, ―chōsakan‖ would have been 
appointed either from court clerks and those eligible as clerks or from 
those who passed the National Bar Examination
7
 but have not been to the 
LRTI and are therefore not properly qualified as lawyers.
8
 In the end, 
 
 
 4. Saibansho ho [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 57. 
 5. There are thirty-seven research judges: one chief research judge, seventeen research judges in 
the minji (civil) chamber (including one senior judge), nine research judges in the gyosei 
(administrative) chamber (including one senior judge), and ten research judges in the keiji (criminal) 
chamber (including one senior judge). These have been the numbers since 2005. Twenty years ago, in 
1989, the figures were one, thirteen, five, and ten, respectively, indicating a huge increase in 
administrative law litigations coming to the Supreme Court. (Information from the Supreme Court 
General Secretariat) (on file with author). 
 6. Saibansho hō, fusoku [Judiciary Act, Supplementary Provisions], Law. No. 59 of 1947, 
Supplementary Provision no. 3. 
 7. KITAGAWA, supra note 2, at 112; see also MASAO ONO, BENGOSHI KARA SAIBANKAN HE 
[FROM A PRACTICING LAWYER TO A JUSTICE] 55 (2000); SHIGEO TAKII, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO HA 
KAWATTA KA? [HAS THE SUPREME COURT CHANGED?] 32 (2009). 
 8. To qualify as a ―lawyer‖ in Japan, in the narrowest sense, there are currently two paths. Until 
2010, one could be a qualified lawyer if one passed the National Bar Examination, spent twelve, 
eighteen, or twenty-four months at the LRTI as a trainee (the length depending on when one decided to 
register at the LRTI), and passed the LRTI final exams. Bengoshi hō [Law Governing Lawyers], Law 
No. 206 of 1949, art. 4 (as written before amendment by Law No. 9 of 2004). After 2006, one has to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/10
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―chōsakan‖ as provided for in the Act were placed in the category 
equivalent to judges, and the supplementary provision outlined above was 
added in 1949, justifying appointments of judges as ―chōsakan.‖9 In 1951, 
the clause referring to those who passed the National Bar Examination was 
deleted.
10
 In spite of several changes in the statutory language, in reality, 
research judges have been with the Court since the beginning, and they 
have always been judges.  
The fact that research judges have always been recruited from younger 
judges appears to support Hiroshi Itoh’s theory that the history of research 
judges goes back to the practice at the Great Court of Cassation, the 
highest court under the 1889 Constitution, not to the American law clerk 
system.
11
 Itoh states that when a young judge at the beginning of his career 
sat to the left side of a presiding judge, he ―assumed . . . the task of 
reviewing a lower court’s handling of facts and law in an appeal‖ under 
the supervision of the senior judge.
12
 In those days, the Great Court of 
Cassation consisted of forty-five judges, in comparison to about thirty 
research judges assisting fifteen Justices today. 
The fact that the Supreme Court was newly established in 1947 with a 
different mandate makes Justice Kitagawa’s view based upon statutory 
evidence more persuasive, although, in deciding details such as the 
 
 
graduate from one of seventy-four law schools with a J.D. equivalent, pass the New National Bar 
Examination, spend twelve months at the LRTI as a trainee, and pass the LRTI final exams. Bengoshi 
hō [Law Governing Lawyers], Law No. 9 of 2004, art. 4. There have been several exceptions: for 
example, under the old rule, law professors teaching (in theory, any legal subjects, but in reality, bar 
exam subjects) at a university granting undergraduate and graduate degrees in law could apply to local 
bar associations to register as practicing lawyers. Bengoshi hō [Law Governing Lawyers], Law No. 
206 of 1949, art. 5 (as written before amendment by Law No. 9 of 2004). Under the new system, those 
who passed the New National Bar Examination but did not go to the LRTI may become qualified if 
they have spent some years in positions related to law. Bengoshi hō [Law Governing Lawyers], Law 
No. 9 of 2004, art. 5. In any case, persons who had been Supreme Court Justices are qualified as 
lawyers, notwithstanding article 4. Bengoshi hō [Law Governing Lawyers], Law No. 206 of 1949, 
art. 6. 
 9. Law No. 177 of 1949. 
 10. Law No. 59 of 1951.  
 11. ITOH, supra note 2, at 57–58. 
 12. Id. at 58. This form of on-the-job training for junior judges is not limited to the Great Court 
of Cassation of the past but continues to this day. In any three-judge panel, be it at a district court or at 
a high court, the most junior judge who sits to the left of the presiding judge will write a draft opinion 
reviewing facts and parties’ arguments, after sounding other judges’ opinions. Under the presiding 
judge’s tutelage, this draft opinion eventually becomes the judgment of the court. Yet, it should be 
noted that research judges are not novices sitting next to an experienced Justice, but are exceptionally 
able and bright judges who are viewed as elites among lower court judges, and they might be 
supporting someone who has never had the experience of being a judge before coming to the Supreme 
Court. See ITOH, supra note 2, at 64. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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number of research judges to be assigned, prewar experience, as Itoh 
suggested, might have had some influence. 
II. RESEARCH JUDGE SYSTEM AND HOW IT WORKS 
The current Supreme Court Rule (SCR) No. 8 concerning the chief 
research judge and others
13
 dates from December 2, 1968. There are thirty-
seven ―research judges‖ at the moment.14 One chief research judge, or 
―shuseki chōsakan,‖15 is responsible for all matters concerning ―research 
judges at the Supreme Court.‖16 Three senior research judges, or ―joseki 
chōsakans,‖17 under the direction of the chief research judge, will manage 
matters concerning research judges at the Supreme Court.
18
 The other 
thirty-three
19
 are assigned to three chambers: minji (civil), keiji (criminal), 
and gyōsei (administrative). Each of the three senior research judges 
mentioned above is in charge of one of the three chambers.
20
 There are 
three rooms in the civil chamber, one in the administrative chamber, and 
three in the criminal chamber. 
Because they are judges, and because they are part of Japanese career 
judiciary, these research judges are assigned to the present positions by the 
Supreme Court. Nominally, they belong either to Tokyo District or High 
Court while serving as research judges and will be relocated to high courts 
or to district courts as ordinary judges after spending four to five years at 
one of these chambers.
21
 This means that nine or ten judges are appointed 
as new research judges every year, making the annual turnover rate high. 
A few have had the chance to serve as research judges twice in their entire 
career as a judge. 
 
 
 13. Saikō saibansho shuseki chōsakan to ni kansuru kisoku [Rule Concerning the Chief Research 
Judge], Sup.Ct. Rule No. 8 of 1968, Kampō No. 12591, p. 2 (as amended by Sup. Ct. Rule No. 2 of 
1981, Kampō No. 16248, p. 2) [hereinafter SCR No. 8]. 
 14. See supra note 5. 
 15. The current chief research judge was first appointed as an associate judge about thirty-five 
years ago and has been at the judiciary ever since. See supra note 5. 
 16. SCR No. 8, supra note 13, art. 1. 
 17. Current senior research judges themselves have just about thirty years of experience as 
judges. 
 18. SCR No. 8, art. 2. This article was added by the 1981 amendment to the SCR. See Kampō 
[Official Journal], March 26, 1981. 
 19. Their experience as judges varies from eleven to twenty-three years. See note 5, supra. 
 20. It should be noted here that this assignment system means that no research judges consider it 
their task to deal with constitutional litigation as such, even though the most important ground for both 
codes of procedure is constitutional issues. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 21. Ono has the impression that research judges in civil and administrative chambers remain in 
the same position for four years, whereas those at the criminal chamber usually leave after three years. 
ONO, supra note 7, at 56. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/10
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Theoretically, the Judicial Conference, consisting of all Justices of the 
Supreme Court, is the ultimate organization to determine all administrative 
matters pertaining to the Judiciary, including hiring and assigning judges 
to courts all over Japan.
22
 According to the black-letter law, it is the 
Supreme Court who appoints research judges to their positions.
23
 Having 
said this, I must emphasize that Justices admit that proposals, be it on 
personnel, budgetary, or even SCR and other rules coming from the 
Secretariat, are invariably ratified without any amendment at the 
conference.
24
 In reality, Justices do not decide personally who will be 
chosen as research judges to help them.
25
 The Secretariat, whose members 
are invariably judges of high caliber, exercises the power to assign all 
judges to their individual positions, including those at the Secretariat and 
research judges.
26
 In early years, one young judge was audacious enough 
to refuse to promise that he would accept any assignment after spending 
three years at Kōriyama.27 I have not heard of another case in which a 
judge refused to be relocated, but then, the judge has the choice of leaving 
the judiciary to practice or teach if she does not want to go to wherever she 
will be assigned.
28
  
 
 
 22. Saibansho hō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 12, 57. 
 23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 24. Takii cannot remember an occasion in which a proposal from the Secretariat had been 
amended. TAKII, supra note 7, at 17. 
 25. Justices who have not been at the Secretariat themselves usually do not have sufficient 
knowledge of all judges, or even the best and the brightest among them, to decide who will be suitable 
for what position, particularly if one realizes that several hundred judges move around each year. 
 26. The Secretariat also controls the budget within the judiciary, Saibansho hō [Judiciary Act], 
Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 83, and negotiates judicial budget with the Ministry of Finance. In YOSHIO 
ISHIKAWA, OMOIDASU MAMA [AS I REMEMBER] 227–308 (2006), Judge Ishikawa recounts a vivid 
memory of one such negotiation in 1968.  
 27. ISHIKAWA, supra note 26, at 143–46. Judge Ishikawa, after going through Articles 78 and 80 
of Kempō (the Constitution) and Article 48 of the Saibansho hō, reached the conclusion that a judge 
cannot be relocated to a court in another area during his tenure as a judge. The chief judge of the 
Yokohama District Court arranged for him to talk with a director-general at the Secretariat, who also is 
a judge, and he was told that he need not sign such a document. This was because he was going out to 
Kōriyama, a ―rural‖ area, as opposed to coming into an ―urban‖ area. In other words, if a young judge 
was assigned to Tokyo District Court, for example, he had to sign and should not refuse, after three 
years, to go anywhere. Judge Ishikawa opines that depriving judges of the constitutionally protected 
position and making all judges pawns for the Secretariat has made judges weak-kneed and apathetic 
bureaucrats who have forgotten that they are an important part of the constitutional structure of Japan. 
ISHIKAWA, supra note 26, at 148. 
 28. I also noticed that of the practitioners who were recruited as judges in the last two decades, 
quite a few had been judges before. This lateral movement of becoming a judge after some years of 
practice is often understood to signify the ―unification of the bar and the bench,‖ one of the most 
important goals of the Federation of Japanese Bar Associations (FJBA). See Hōsō ichigen no jitsugen 
ni mukete bengoshi ninkan wo zenkai agete suishin suru ketsugi [Resolution to Promote and 
Accomplish the ―Unification of the Bar and the Bench‖ by All Members of the FJBA by 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A very rough estimate by one of the senior research judges whom I 
interviewed is that about eighty percent of present research judges have 
had their ―year abroad‖ experience, mostly in the United States, Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom. In other words, they are a select few 
who are relatively familiar with foreign legal systems, legal trends, and 
new theories. 
A. The Tasks 
In his paper discussing research judges, the future Justice Kitagawa 
indicated that they are there to ―conduct the research necessary for trial 
and adjudication of a case as instructed by‖29 the Justices, to provide their 
opinions if necessary, and to attend the Justices’ conferences.30 
According to Judge Kurata,
31
 who was a research judge from 1959 to 
1963, research judges write case memoranda (and present that report to a 
Justice in charge of that case), attend Justices’ conferences whenever 
asked,
32
 help Justices select judgments to be published as ―hanrei‖ or 
precedents of the Supreme Court in the narrowest sense of the word, and 
write case notes known as ―chōsakan kaisetsu.‖ Five decades later, current 
research judges confirm during interviews that they continue to perform 
the same tasks that Judge Kurata mentioned. 
1. Case Assignment and Research 
The Supreme Court Manual on arrangements concerning chambers
33
 
defines ―civil‖ as all matters of civil dispute, excluding those matters 
 
 
Recommending Appointment of Judges from the Practicing Lawyers], FEDERATION OF JAPANESE BAR 
ASSOCIATIONS, May 8, 2001, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/opinion/report/2001_27.html. 
 29. Saibansho ho [Judiciary Act], Law. No. 59 of 1947, art. 57(2). It should be noted that this 
Article applies not just to the Supreme Court but to research judges at all levels of the judiciary. 
 30. KITAGAWA, supra note 2, at 113–14. 
 31. Takuji Kurata’s Saibankan no sengo shi (A Postwar History of a Judge) was written as a 
series of essays published in the Hanrei Times, a legal biweekly publication. The relevant parts are in 
780 HANREI TAIMUZU (HT) 62 (1992); 781 HT 46 (1992); 784 HT 39 (1992); 787 HT 51 (1992); 789 
HT 47 (1992); 792 HT 60 (1992); 796 HT 51 (1992); 797 HT 18 (1992); 799 HT 30 (1993); 802 HT 
59 (1993); 805 HT 39 (1993); 808 HT 33 (1993); 811 HT 6 (1993); 814 HT 7 (1993); 816 HT 73 
(1993); 817 HT 3 (1993); 818 HT 6 (1993); and 819 HT 8 (1993). 
 32. Judge Kurata’s writings indicate that regular attendance at Justices’ conferences was not 
expected when he was a research judge. The First Petty Bench never allowed research judges to attend, 
but the Second Petty Bench expected research judges to attend all conferences, and the Third Petty 
Bench would ask a research judge whenever Justices thought it necessary. Takuji Kurata, Saibankan 
no sengo shi [A Postwar History of a Judge], 781 HANREI TAIMUZU 46, 46 (1992). 
 33. Saikō saibansho chōsakan-shitsu jimu toriatsukai yōryō [The Supreme Court Manual on 
Arrangements Concerning Research Judges’ Chambers] (1981). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/10
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assigned to the ―administrative‖ chamber and including matters 
concerning industrial properties;
34
 ―criminal‖ as all criminal cases; and 
―administrative‖ as all administrative cases, civil labor disputes, and civil 
cases listed in article 45, Section 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act.
35
 
Senior civil and administrative research judges may, after consultation, 
assign civil and administrative cases pertaining to industrial properties, 
civil cases whose outcome will be greatly affected by interpretation and 
application of administrative law, and other cases deemed appropriate for 
administrative research judges to conduct research. The Manual also 
mentions collaborative research by providing that such research shall be 
conducted whenever a Justice in charge of a case designates collaborative 
research for the case, or the chief research judge deems it appropriate for 
several research judges, either within one chamber or among two or more 
chambers, to conduct research together.
36
 Having said this, it has been the 
practice to classify cases being appealed to the Supreme Court into the 
above-mentioned three categories—civil, criminal, and administrative—as 
they are filed and then allocate them mechanically within the three 
chambers.  
The practice has been for a research judge to start the research as soon 
as she is assigned her case (without waiting for some instruction from a 
Justice assigned to the case).
37
 The research shall cover the applicable 
 
 
 34. Industrial properties refer to patent, new designs for practical use, design, trademark, unfair 
competition, and copyright cases. (―Industrial properties‖ is a 1980s parlance of what we would now 
call ―intellectual properties.‖) One intellectual property case will be counted as the equivalent of two 
ordinary civil cases in assignment. 
 35. Gyōsei jiken soshō hō [Administrative Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 45, § 1. 
 Article 45, section 1 provides that: 
Court shall apply article 23 sections 1 and 2, and article 39, mutatis mutandis, whenever the 
existence and/or validity of an administrative decision or adjudication is disputed in 
litigations concerning private legal rights. 
Id. Article 23 gives discretion to courts to allow relevant, but nonparty, administrative agencies to 
intervene in litigations between a private entity and the original agency. Article 39 states that courts 
will notify an administrative agency whenever a litigation to confirm the existence of a legal 
relationship based on the agency’s administrative decision or adjudication has been filed against the 
party to the aforesaid decision or adjudication. 
 36. The Supreme Court Manual, supra note 33, at pt. IV, § 4.  
 37. The allocation of cases to Justices also happens mechanically in that cases are assigned to 
three petty benches as they are filed, and within each petty bench, they are assigned to the five (or 
four) Justices in rotation. In the past, it was the custom for Chief Justices not to participate in the 
assignment, deliberations, and decisions of his petty bench, thus limiting the number of Justices to 
four. At his first press conference on November 25, 2008, the present Chief Justice Hironobu Takezaki 
declared that he would like to join the petty bench rotation because he has not experienced being at the 
Supreme Court as an Associate Justice. See Kazumi Kitamura, Saiban’in “Kokumin no Rikai wo” 
[(The New Chief Justice Urges) Citizens to Accept Lay Judge System] MAINICHI SHIMBUN [MAINICHI 
NEWSPAPER], Nov. 26, 2008, at 28. He has been true to his words, because a judgment rendered on 
March 9, 2009, by the Second Petty Bench indicated that that he presided over a case that was 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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statutes (i.e., the text), legislative history (including legislative facts), 
important court decisions interpreting the statute (particularly whether 
there are relevant precedents by the Court), influential academic theories, 
practice, and foreign statutes, cases, and theories whenever relevant. These 
materials are distilled into a short memorandum to the Justice who is 
assigned the case. She is often called the presiding Justice for the case.  
For a research judge, it is important to write that memorandum in a 
form useful to the presiding Justice. Thus, she states the facts and issues 
and explains what law should be applicable and why, based on the 
materials she had gone through. It is not rare for a Justice to ask for a 
further memorandum to clarify some points of law or to address new 
issues which appeared irrelevant at the beginning. Not necessarily in all 
cases, but sometimes (and sometimes too often, particularly when its 
conclusion is considered patently obvious), research judges do not hesitate 
to express their opinions in memoranda based on the research they have 
done.
38
 A research judge’s memorandum is, in its official status, merely 
one piece of information among many that a Justice shall take into 
consideration. In reality, it appears to have enormous weight and influence 
in the actual decision process. 
One research judge is assigned to one case to do research, and she 
conducts the research by herself. She usually has several cases under 
investigation at the same time. Collaborative research, although mentioned 
in the Manual, is rare. Yet research judges usually talk of their research 
being collaborative. It has long been customary at chambers to talk with 
other research judges about the issues and the merits of cases they are 
handling. Exchanges of views among research judges are informal and 
very frequent, and every research judge I have met refers to these 
exchanges as extremely helpful. In fact, some appear to consider that these 
exchanges should be done regularly, and a senior research judge should 
 
 
assigned to him like other Justices. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 9, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 27. There are two more judgments bearing his name as the 
presiding Justice apart from the September 30, 2009, Grand Bench decision of 2009, Saikō Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] Sept. 30, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1520. See Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 24, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 765 (2d petty 
bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 16, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1799 (2d petty bench). As far as the author could tell, in other cases decided by the Second Petty 
Bench where other Justices are in charge, judgments are rendered by four Justices. For an explanation 
of the Minshū and Keishū, see infra note 72. My interview with research judges in the summer of 2010 
revealed that, at the moment, Chief Justice Takezaki has not scheduled himself to join his Second 
Petty Bench peers’ rotation. However, they emphasized that it is a matter of schedule rather than of an 
apparent decision not to join the rotation anymore.  
 38. According to Ono, a draft judgment was attached to every case report. ONO, supra note 7, 
at 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/10
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carefully manage her chamber so that she knows what is going on, what 
stage each research has reached, what issues are troubling the research 
judge in charge, and other matters for each case on which research is being 
done. The physical conditions also promote mutual accessibility and the 
daily exchange of ideas in that two or three research judges share one 
room, and rooms belonging to one chamber are clustered and occupy the 
same floor within the fortress-like Supreme Court Building. Each chamber 
has its own shelves of case reports and statutory compilations. The 
research judges cannot avoid bumping into each other as part of their daily 
routine even if they do not intend to.  
Civil, administrative, and criminal chambers have different practices 
and traditions vis-à-vis the inner workings of each chamber.
39
 The 
difference also may be due to the personalities of the senior research judge 
in charge of each chamber as well. Administrative research judges 
mentioned that they have to check with their senior research judge while 
conducting their research and that they often have chamber workshops to 
discuss a case. Civil research judges mentioned that their workshops do 
not necessarily involve all members of their chamber. There could be a 
couple of workshops going on at the same time within the civil chamber. 
Justice Kitagawa mentions that the merits of having these in-chamber 
workshops are that it gives opportunities to look at important issues from 
different perspectives before submitting a case memorandum to a 
presiding Justice and that it helps to avoid not-so-apparent conflicts of 
precedent.
40
  
There is also a formal setting where all research judges gather together 
about once a month to go over hard cases, known as ―chosakan kenkyu-
kai.‖ These workshops are presided over by a senior research judge. A 
research judge in charge of the case in question becomes the ―reporter‖ 
and describes the facts, issues, and possible approaches to be taken. Then, 
the floor is open to all. When a ―chosakan kenkyu-kai‖ reaches a certain 
conclusion, many Justices feel that that conclusion from the workshop 
should not be treated lightly. 
 
 
 39. A senior criminal research judge mentioned that his workload includes case research like 
other research judges, whereas a senior civil research judge did not refer to doing case research as her 
workload. 
 40. KITAGAWA, supra note 2, at 113. Research judges in civil chambers and criminal chambers 
see their tasks quite differently and are very much aware of the differences. The explanation given was 
based upon the differences in the provisions concerning final civil appeals, MINJI SOSHŌHŌ 
[MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] arts. 312, 318, and final criminal appeals, KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. 
CRIM. PRO.] arts. 405, 406, 411. See infra note 41. 
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2. Discretionary Appeals, Case Selection, and “Conference 
Worthiness” 
There is one outstanding difference between the Japanese Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court in the area of discretionary 
appeals and case selection. The wording of both codes of procedure
41
 
indicates that all appeals to the Japanese Supreme Court are strictly limited 
and discretionary, even when constitutional violations are alleged. 
Furthermore, the Japanese Supreme Court may accept cases to unify the 
interpretation of laws and regulations and to enforce the de facto binding 
authority of its own precedent.
42
 
 
 
 41. Minsohō, the Code of Civil Procedure, and Keisohō, the Code of Criminal Procedure, state 
the terms of the final appeal to the Supreme Court somewhat differently.  
Minsohō, article 312, provides that 
(1) A final appeal may be filed by reason that a judgment contains a misconstruction of the 
Constitution or any other violation of the Constitution.  
(2) A final appeal may also be filed by reason of the existence of any of the following 
grounds; provided, however, that this shall not apply to the grounds set forth in item (iv) 
where ratification is made under the provision of Article 34(2) (including cases where applied 
mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 59): 
 (i) the court rendering judgment was not composed under any Acts; 
 (ii) a judge who may not participate in making the judgment under any Acts participated 
in making the judgment; 
 (iii) the judgment was made in violation of the provisions concerning exclusive 
jurisdiction (excluding cases where any of the courts specified in the items of Article 6(1) 
made a final judgment in the first instance when the suit is subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of another court pursuant to the provision of Article 6(1)); 
 (iv) the judgment was made in the absence of the authority of statutory representation, 
authority of representation in a suit or the delegation of powers necessary for performing 
procedural acts; 
 (v) the judgment was made in violation of the provision on the opening of oral argument 
to the public; 
  (vi) the judgment lacks reasons, or the reasons attached to the judgment are inconsistent.  
MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 312. KEISOHŌ, article 405, provides that 
A final appeal may be filed with the Supreme Court against a final judgment made by a high 
court as the court of second instance or the court of first instance by following reasons: 
 (i) the judgment contains a misconstruction of the Constitution or any other violation of 
the Constitution, 
 (ii) the judgment contains a determination that is inconsistent with precedents rendered 
by the Supreme Court, 
 (iii) the judgment contains a determination that is inconsistent with precedents rendered 
by the Court of Cassation (Daisin’in) or by high courts as the final appellate court or the court 
of second instance, in the absence of precedents rendered by the Supreme Court. 
KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 405. 
 42. Minsohō, article 318(1), provides that 
With regard to a case in which the judgment in prior instance contains a determination that is 
inconsistent with precedents rendered by the Supreme Court (or precedents rendered by the 
Court of Cassation (Daishin’in) or those rendered by high courts as the final appellate court or 
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There is an average of over 9000 appeals annually.
43
 Yet neither the 
codes nor the rules of procedure provide for an initial process to select 
cases worthy of full and detailed deliberation from among all appellate 
cases. In short, the court lacks a process equivalent to the review of 
petitions for certiorari, a distinct process the United States Supreme Court 
uses to exercise its discretionary judgment. This lack of a case-shifting 
procedure and the public’s expectation that all appellate cases are treated 
in the same manner have produced an enormous burden upon the Justices. 
Even the fact that the Code of Criminal Procedure, since 1948, and the 
Code of Civil Procedure, since 1998, have abolished the right of appeal to 
the Supreme Court except on constitutional grounds
44
 has not been 
 
 
the court of second instance, if there are no precedents rendered by the Supreme Court) or any 
other case in which the judgment in prior instance is found to involve material matters 
concerning the construction of laws and regulations, where the court with which a final 
appeal shall be filed is the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, upon petition, by an order, 
may accept such case as the final appellate court.  
MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 318(1). KEISOHŌ, article 406, provides that 
Notwithstanding the preceding article which defines instances of appeal, the Supreme Court 
may accept as a court of final appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court, 
cases whose judgment in prior instance are found to involve material matters concerning the 
construction of laws and regulations and have not been finalized.  
(c) The Supreme Court, as a court of error, has the power to quash or overrule judgments 
below if it deems it appropriate . . . . 
KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 406. MINSOHŌ, article 325(2), provides that 
The Supreme Court, as the final appellate court, even where the grounds prescribed in Article 
312(1) or (2) do not exist, may quash the judgment in prior instance if there is a violation of 
laws or regulations that apparently affects a judgment, and except in the cases set forth in the 
following Article, may remand the case to the court of prior instance or transfer the case to 
another court equivalent thereto. 
MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 325. KEISOHŌ, article 411, provides that 
A court of final appeal may overrule the judgment in prior instance in cases which do not 
satisfy any requirement as provided by Article 405, it would have been in great violation of 
justice not to overrule if at least one of the following items exists: 
 (i) a violation of laws or regulations apparently affects a judgment, 
 (ii) the sentence is utterly disproportionate and improper, 
 (iii) the erroneous finding of material facts which apparently affects a judgment, 
 (iv) there is a reason to demand for a new trial, 
 (v) the crime was either abolished, or altered, or was the defendant pardoned, after the 
judgment. 
KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 411. 
 43. The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction over ―appeals to court order‖ cases. See Saibansho 
hō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 7. For judicial statistics, see Justice Statistics, COURTS IN 
JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/ search/jtsp0010 (last visited May 4, 2011). The most recent figures 
are of the year 2009, in which there are 6927 new civil and administrative cases and 3856 new 
criminal cases being filed at the Supreme Court. 
 44. The texts of the Minsohō and Keisohō, supra notes 41 and 42, suggest that challenges based 
on constitutional issues are also subject to the Court’s discretion. They have been construed so the 
Court will accept all final appeals raising nonfrivolous constitutional issues. 
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sufficient even among lawyers to justify differentiated processes.
45
 To 
make matters worse, because the Supreme Court has the power to quash or 
overrule judgments below if it deems it appropriate, as noted above, 
appeals and petitions are filed even when there are no appropriate grounds 
to file appeals and petitions. Justices feel that they are expected to go 
through all the documents relevant to each case assigned to them, and they 
look for some help to separate the wheat from the chaff. Thus, it naturally 
falls upon research judges to select ―conference-worthy‖ cases.  
If a research judge comes to the conclusion that a case is not 
conference worthy, she presents a case report indicating that conclusion to 
the presiding Justice in charge of the case, with all the relevant documents. 
If the presiding Justice agrees with the disposition recommended in the 
report, usually to dismiss the appeal or petition without referring the case 
to the Justices’ conference, the case report will be circulated to other 
Justices belonging to the same petty bench.
46
 Each Justice would go 
through relevant documents separately. The process is called conference 
by circulation, or ―mochi mawari shingi.‖ When all five Justices (or four 
in the present Second Petty Bench
47
) agree, the appeal or petition is 
formally dismissed without being discussed at a face-to-face conference. 
There is a template form for the dismissal of a petition,
48
 known 
colloquially as ―three lines and a half,‖ because it resembles a letter of 
divorce agreement during the Tokugawa period, which was written in 
three lines and a half. 
A Justice could object to a case being treated in this manner, in which 
case it would be reclassified as conference worthy, and the research judge 
in charge would be expected to produce a more detailed memorandum. 
These reclassified cases do exist, but in most instances, the evaluations of 
Justices and research judges do not differ much.
49
 Thus, the voluminous 
 
 
 45. It surprises this author to find that some lawyers submit exactly the same argument for an 
Article 312 final appeal and an Article 318 petition for acceptance of a final appeal, even though the 
requirements are substantially different. See supra notes 41 and 42 (discussing the Minsohō). 
 46. Takii mentions that at the Third Petty Bench, an assigned Justice would draft a short 
memorandum and circulate it together with a research judge’s report in all cases, not just ―conference-
worthy‖ ones, whereas a Justice at the Second Petty Bench was not expected to indicate his opinions 
even for ―conference-worthy‖ cases, illustrating that each petty bench has its own rules and customs. 
TAKII, supra note 7, at 22. 
 47. See supra note 37.  
 48. As with a decision to deny a petition for certiorari, there occasionally are dissents to 
dismissals, indicating that one or more Justices believed the case should not be dismissed. See TAKII, 
supra note 7, at 23. 
 49. Ono mentions that he found that he, a liberal practitioner, would agree with research judges’ 
reports around ninety percent of the time, and the ten percent difference he experienced was more 
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caseload is the reason for having research judges to the Supreme Court 
and for them to start their research before being given any instruction from 
the presiding Justice. 
Research judges usually explain that most appeals and petitions 
actually do not state appropriate reasons to file the appeals and just 
indicate the fact that the appealing party is not happy with the judgment 
below. According to their view, any lawyer worthy of her name would 
have agreed with most judgments below on matters of law. Because the 
Supreme Court has the power and authority to quash or overrule 
judgments below if it deems it appropriate, even if there is no question of 
law involved, and because one of the reasons it could do so could be some 
error by lower courts on questions of fact, it is not enough in the eyes of 
research judges to read just the appellate briefs presented to the Supreme 
Court stating issues of law.
50
 Thus, research judges say they feel obligated 
to go through all relevant materials available before concluding that a case 
is not conference worthy. 
In a way, this selection process very much resembles the certiorari pool 
memorandum that the Justices share at the United States Supreme Court. 
But case memoranda here are not single-page ―flimsies,‖ and it requires 
five votes (or four in the present Second Petty Bench) from all Justices on 
that petty bench for a case to be dismissed as not conference worthy. 
Research judges mention that they would rather wrongly recommend a 
case as conference worthy than wrongly recommend a case as not 
conference worthy—the very reason that their research appears to be 
thorough, making sure no stone is left unturned. 
Research judges believe that most petitions fail to state requisite 
grounds for appeal in their brief, as the claims are not really about 
misconstruction of the Constitution or other violations of the Constitution. 
Yet, unlike the United States Supreme Court, as governed by Supreme 
Court Rule 10,
51
 the Japanese Supreme Court is willing to reach out to 
parties who have been wronged. Fittingly, both codes leave plenty of room 
 
 
often a matter of jurisprudential difference, rather than a matter of disagreements in legal 
technicalities. ONO, supra note 7, at 57. 
 50. There is a distinct difference in the manner of dealing with assigned cases between research 
judges belonging to the civil chamber and those belonging to the criminal chamber. The latter are far 
more concerned with the possibility of erroneous findings of fact that might deprive an innocent 
person of her life or liberty. 
 51. Rule 10 of the United States Supreme Court states that ―[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not 
a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons.‖ SUP. CT. R. 10. Also important is the fact that ―[a] petition for a writ of certiorari 
is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of 
a properly stated rule of law.‖ Id. 
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for appeals on grounds of erroneous factual findings and misapplication of 
statutes and rules.
52
 Research judges, especially those in the criminal 
chamber, are eager to tell us that almost all appeals assert that ―the 
judgment below contains a misconstruction of, or is in violation of the 
Constitution, or a determination that is inconsistent with precedents 
rendered by the Supreme Court,‖53 but in fact they merely allege that the 
judgment below applied a construction of laws or regulations which was 
different from the one that the party asserted, that there was an erroneous 
finding of material fact that could affect the outcome of the case, or the 
sentence is utterly disproportionate and improper.
54
 Nevertheless, research 
judges feel obliged to go through all records and check, for example, the 
credibility of the defendant’s confession by examining the appropriate 
evidence. It is my impression that documents in criminal cases are far 
more voluminous, and case memoranda far more detailed, than those in 
civil cases. In criminal appeals, it is considered conference worthy when 
defendants continue to deny the charge or have confessed under dubious 
circumstances, where the case has attracted social attention, or where the 
death penalty was ordered.
55
 Research judges, especially in the criminal 
chamber, are greatly concerned with ferreting out any erroneous factual 
findings that may influence the outcome of a case because it is their belief, 
shared very much by society, that it is the role of the Court to examine 
whether the defendant was wrongfully convicted, to correct any wrong, 
and to bring justice. Thus, research judges take extreme care and will go 
the extra mile to scrutinize all documents available so as not to miss any 
errors in factual findings. The pressure that research judges feel in 
reaching the right conclusion is probably much greater than that felt by 
law clerks at the United States Supreme Court, which does not define itself 
as a court of final correction.
56
  
 
 
 52. See supra note 42. 
 53. KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 405. 
 54. KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 411. 
 55. TAKII, supra note 7, at 25. 
 56. It apparently boggled the minds of research judges to hear that new evidence indicating that 
the defendant might be innocent does not necessarily mean a judgment ordering a new trial at the 
United States Supreme Court. The Japanese government rarely gives a pardon to those who are 
wrongly convicted. Instead, the Supreme Court orders a new trial in which public prosecutors might 
file for dismissal of the case, or they might still charge, but the defendants might eventually be found 
not guilty. 
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3. Justices’ Conferences 
Justices’ conferences are held once or twice a week. A grand bench 
conference would be on Wednesday,
57
 and each petty bench designates 
days of the week as its conference day(s).
58
 A senior Justice of each petty 
bench would determine the agenda of the day, usually three to five cases, 
after receiving reports from responsible Justices that a case is ready to be 
discussed. Unlike the United States Supreme Court practice, research 
judges attend Justices’ conferences.59  The explanation for their regular 
attendance is that they are there to answer questions that may arise during 
the Justices’ discussion. It also helps a research judge whenever she is 
asked to do some additional research on the case if she knows why such a 
request was made and in what context. The rule at these conferences is 
that research judges will not speak unless spoken to.
60
 Instead of speaking 
up, they take notes. These notes form the basis of the first draft of 
judgments that research judges will write. It may take several sessions 
before the Justices come to a conclusion and direct the research judge to 
start drafting a judgment.
61
 Drafts are circulated so that the Justices will 
have time to go through them before the next conference.
62
 These notes 
would undoubtedly provide windows into what is really happening at the 
Court. But the likelihood of these notes or initial drafts slipping out of 
chambers and being circulated outside of that Stone Fortress appears to be 
nil. Do we need to be reminded that they are judges with brilliant futures? 
As for the current chief research judge, one look at the list of recent chief 
 
 
 57. Since there are so few cases being referred to the Grand Bench, the judicial conference, supra 
note 24, takes place on most Wednesdays. See ONO, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 58. Conference days were on Tuesdays and Fridays for the Third Petty Bench in the 1980s and 
1990s. See MASAMI ITO, SAIBANKAN TO GAKUSHA NO AIDA [BETWEEN A JUSTICE AND A SCHOLAR] 
8–9 (1993); ONO, supra note 7, at 8. Itoh states that the original practice was to meet on Mondays and 
Thursdays for the First Petty Bench, Mondays and Fridays for the Second Petty Bench, and Tuesdays 
and Fridays for the Third Petty Bench, but they now meet less frequently. ITOH, supra note 2, at 66. 
 59. According to Kitagawa, supra note 2, at 113, research judges regularly attend Justices’ 
conferences, but it was not so when Kurata was a research judge. Kurata, supra note 32, at 46. See 
supra note 31. The practice appears to have changed somewhere between the 1960s and the 1980s. 
Ono understands that the change occurred sometime in the early 1980s. ONO, supra note 7, at 26. 
Also, Justices refer to the fact that each petty bench has its own practices and procedures. See, e.g., 
ITO, supra note 58, at 8; TAKII, supra note 7, at 22. 
 60. KITAGAWA, supra note 2, at 113–14; ONO, supra note 7, at 27. 
 61. According to Takii, the Supreme Court may recommend settlement. On such occasions, the 
actual negotiation and facilitation process is relegated to research judges. TAKII, supra note 7, at 23. 
 62. Id. at 30. 
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research judges suggests that he
63
 has an excellent chance of being 
nominated as a Justice in the not-so-distant future.
64
 
Grand Bench conferences are held only when the Supreme Court is set 
to decide the constitutionality of a new statute, rule, or regulation; to 
declare a statute, rule, regulation, order, or act unconstitutional; or to 
overrule a precedent.
65
 Since all cases are allocated to petty benches when 
filed, it has made Justices reluctant to refer cases to the Grand Bench. The 
explanation is that with six decades of precedent, there are enough ratio 
decidendi for every new case coming to the Court now.
66
 It also has been 
mentioned many times by the Justices themselves that adding a very 
complex conference case to the Court’s agenda will take time and increase 
the burden upon fellow Justices, and every Justice would try to avoid 
placing this extra burden upon his colleagues.
67
 Once a petty bench 
decides
68
 that a case will be referred to the Grand Bench, the research 
judge will write a new (and more detailed, sometimes exceeding two 
hundred pages) case memorandum.
69
 The chief research judge and the 
senior research judge, as well as the original research judge, will attend the 
Grand Bench conference at which all fifteen Justices are present and the 
Chief Justice presides. It is the task of the chief research judge, not the 
original research judge, to explain the materials and documents prepared 
for the occasion. After all the Justices have spoken and the Chief Justice 
sorts out the issues and arguments, research judges prepare the initial draft 
of the Court’s opinion, while those who do not agree or wish to clarify a 
point will start drafting their own opinions.
70
 
 
 
 63. So far, all chief research judges have been male. 
 64. See Appendix. 
 65. Saibansho hō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 10. 
 66. This often means stretching the scope of a previous ruling to a situation that the Court in the 
previous case probably had not thought through. This might well be an indication that the 
understanding of ―precedents,‖ ―ratio decidendi,‖ and ―stare decisis‖ is quite different from common 
law jurisdictions in the Japanese judiciary. See ITO, supra note 58, at 22–69.  
 67. See, e.g., TAKII, supra note 7, at 28; ONO, supra note 7, at 40–42.  
 68. Since all cases are first allocated to petty benches, the petty bench to which the case was 
allocated decides whether the case should be referred to the Grand Bench and files a request to the 
Judicial Conference to decide whether to refer the case to the Grand Bench. At the conference, it 
would be the task of the Justice in charge of the case to explain the request, including what had 
transpired at the petty bench conference.  
 69. This memorandum is usually accompanied by two versions of a draft judgment, one 
dismissing the appeal, the other reversing the judgment below. ONO, supra note 7, at 37. 
 70. TAKII, supra note 7, at 29. Research judges do not assist Justices writing minority opinions. 
ONO, supra note 7, at 37. There appear to be several reasons why Justices are discouraged from 
writing separate opinions. ONO, supra note 7, at 105; ITO, supra note 58, at 45. 
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4. Hanrei Selection 
Not all Supreme Court decisions are published in Japan.
71
 It falls upon 
the Supreme Court precedent selection committee, or ―saikō saibansho 
hanrei iinkai,‖ to select which judgments will be published and declared 
as precedents. The decisions designated as precedents of the Supreme 
Court, or ―saikō saibansho hanrei,‖ are published in the Supreme Court 
case reports, ―Saikō saibansho hanrei shū,‖72 from publisher Hanrei chōsa 
kai, and the committee’s name appears as the editor. The committee 
consists of six Justices, two from each petty bench, and they meet once a 
month, separately, for civil and criminal cases. All research judges attend 
committee meetings as secretaries or ―kanji,‖ but their function is not 
limited to mere attendance. Research judges have workshops beforehand 
and discuss not just which decisions should be published, but also what 
issues are being decided, ―hanji jikō,‖ and the ratio decidendi, ―hanketsu 
yōshi‖ or ―kettei yōshi,‖ of the decision. Each research judge is ready at 
committee meetings to present the cases assigned to her that have been 
decided since the last meeting, including a summary of the issues being 
decided, the ratio decidendi, and the relevant statutes and decisions. After 
the research judge finishes fielding questions, mostly from other research 
judges, a senior Justice presiding over the meeting takes a vote on whether 
to publish the case.
73
 Lately, cases are officially published in about six 
months.
74
 
 
 
 71. The status of unpublished opinions is a delicate matter anywhere. Although permissible to 
cite, see FED. R. APP. P. 32.1, the status of unpublished opinions as precedential is still controversial 
even in the United States federal judiciary. One fairly recent discussion of the argument is found in 
David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to 
All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61 (2009). 
 72. The Supreme Court case reports are more commonly known separately as Minshū (Saikō 
saibansho minji hanreishū) and Keishū (Saikō saibansho keiji hanreishū), although they are published 
in the same volume. Those cases not important enough to be published in Minshū or Keishū are filed 
in Saibanshū minji (Saikō saibansho saibanshū minji) or Saibanshū keiji (Saikō saibansho saibanshū 
keiji), which are not ―published,‖ although they are available at the court libraries and at certain 
university libraries. Private publishers also publish the officially unpublished Supreme Court decisions 
in Hanrei Jihō and Hanrei Taimuzu. Anonymous comments accompanying Supreme Court decisions 
published in Hanrei Jihō and Hanrei Taimuzu are said to be written by research judges who wrote 
memoranda for the cases. 
 73. Apparently, because designating the status of precedent is considered an important matter, 
the process is considerably more formal than deciding whether to publish a decision of the United 
States Courts of Appeals in the Federal Reporters. Furthermore, West Publishing Company also 
publishes those decisions designated as ―not for publication‖ in the Federal Appendix. 
 74. The Japanese Supreme Court’s website publishes some decisions within a day or so of its 
official pronouncement. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp (last visited May 4, 
2011). I have not been given any explanation of their selection process so far. To some extent, they 
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Although Japan is a civil law country, judges’ attitudes toward these 
―precedents‖ sometimes surprises practitioners.75 Justice Sonobe writes in 
detail about the difference between a precedent and a judgment in a 
particular case, what is stare decisis or ―senrei hōri,‖ and why all 
precedents should be published.
76
 
5. Case Commentaries 
The first case commentaries, or ―hanrei kaisetsu,‖ written by a research 
judge appeared in the February 1954 issue of Hōsō Jihō.77 Since then, 
commentaries are first published in Hōsō Jihō and then compiled in an 
annual volume. In the beginning, commentaries were published within two 
weeks of the Supreme Court precedent selection committee’s meetings in 
which the committee decided to publish the case. In other words, the case 
and the commentary appeared within two months after the decision was 
handed down,
78
 making the commentary fairly brief. The assumption then 
was that these commentaries were based on case reports and that 
commentaries were not an extra task for research judges who had properly 
prepared case reports.  
In the 1960s, the nature of commentaries began to change. They started 
to include case comments (naturally published after the decision) and 
academic writings, which were not yet available at the time when the case 
was decided. They are no longer brief
79
 or available immediately after the 
decision, and they tend to resemble a scholarly article.
80
  
 
 
cover the precedential cases, but often there are more cases initially published on the website than are 
later officially published in Minshū and Keishū. 
 75. Ono refers to precedent-centricism, or ―hanrei chūshin shugi,‖ as being prevalent in the 
judiciary. ONO, supra note 7, at 105.  
 76. ITSUO SONOBE, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO JŪNEN [A DECADE AT THE SUPREME COURT] 140–42 
(2001). Apparently, Sonobe, as the author of the decision, is irritated by case comments that show 
slight understanding of the important difference between logical explanations leading to stare decisis 
and stare decisis itself. 
 77. 6 HŌSŌ JIHŌ [LAW. ASSOC. J.] 55–100 (Feb. 1, 1954). There are twenty-seven brief 
explanations about cases decided on December 1953 entitled Saikō saibansho hanrei (Judicial 
Precedents of the Supreme Court). The title, Saikō saibansho hanrei kaisetsu (Explanatory Remarks on 
the Supreme Court Decisions), appeared for the first time in the next issue, 6 HŌSŌ JIHŌ [LAW. ASSOC. 
J.] 79 (Mar. 1, 1954).  
 78. In the 1960s, the selection committee meetings of the civil chamber were held around the 
twenty-fifth of the month, and the commentary for each case selected was due on the tenth of the next 
month, allowing judges a fortnight to write. Kurata, supra note 32, at 47. 
 79. In 1954, 125 cases were dealt with in 202 pages, whereas in 1968, commentaries for 151 
cases took some 1500 pages. See TAKII, supra note 7, at 34 n.6, 352.  
 80. Kurata is critical of the present state of commentaries because (1) the timing of its 
publication is unpredictable and (2) the writings should provide just the information that only those 
who had had the opportunity to see records and evidences would know. Kurata, supra note 32, at 48. 
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Because lower courts, lawyers, and law students today often assume 
that what is written in a commentary is the real intention of the court 
rather than the personal opinion of one research judge, they tend to follow 
its suggestions word-for-word. By writing these case commentaries, the 
influence of research judges may be greater than that of the actual 
decisions of the Supreme Court.
81
 Because many people read between the 
lines and assume that case commentaries illustrate the real intent of the 
Supreme Court, this might well be the most controversial aspect of the 
research judges’ tasks. 
6. The Differences 
It is true that law clerks help Justices prepare draft opinions, like 
research judges. But their functional similarities end there. Research 
judges do not differentiate between the process of selecting conference-
worthy cases and the process of researching for final judgments. 
Therefore, they do not stop after reading the appellate briefs when 
deciding whether cases are conference worthy. They inevitably read all 
documents and information submitted from the beginning of trial to the 
latest motions to the Court to make sure there has been no error at any 
stage. They do not confine their search to important issues that the Court 
feels it should deal with now or to issues for which there are conflicting 
judgments from different high courts when they start their initial research. 
This attitude toward the search for errors to be corrected continues until 
the research judges present their case memoranda and recommendations 
for the outcome of each case. They apparently do not distinguish or divide 
their research process between the preparation of memoranda for 
conference worthiness and the preparation of memoranda for conference 
itself. 
Unlike research judges, law clerks do not attend Justices’ conferences. 
I cannot say whether this difference has created any further difference in 
the functions that law clerks and research judges perform. Law clerks are 
 
 
Takii is critical because, in spite of the fact that the commentaries themselves are the works of 
individual research judges without input from their chamber, colleagues, or the presiding Justice 
responsible for the decision, they often are perceived as the authentic explanation by the Court in 
disguise. TAKII, supra note 7, at 35. 
 81. See TAKII, supra note 7, at 36. On the other hand, Sonobe, who was once a senior research 
judge, states that it is essential for anyone studying Supreme Court decisions to read these 
commentaries because the decision and its commentary should be read as one. SONOBE, supra note 76, 
at 14. 
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given sufficient information to help their Justices draft opinions even 
though they are not there. 
Since the Supreme Court of the United States publishes all decisions, 
there is no need to select opinions for publication by either the Justices or 
the law clerks. When federal courts of appeals choose not to publish some 
opinions, it has been up to the judges who authored the opinions to select 
which to publish and which not to publish. The decision whether to 
publish has never been left to law clerks, even if they might have helped to 
write the opinions.  
Another thing a law clerk would not attempt to do is to write about the 
case she had worked on with the kind of authority that research judges 
assume. Research judges see it as their obligation to publish their research 
results and more, so that others may have a better understanding of the 
case in question. This is a rather peculiar phenomenon in that Japanese 
judges and Justices often refer to a legal maxim: ―a judge should not 
explain her judgment except by the opinion she wrote.‖ A good judgment 
should contain, accordingly, everything necessary and sufficient but no 
more. This maxim has often been used as the reason Justices decline to 
speak publicly. In fact, Justices never give public speeches, even to law 
school students or at academic conferences, while they are on bench. Yet, 
it is considered a part of research judges’ tasks to publish commentaries of 
cases they researched as some sort of authority.  
Research judges perform distinctively different functions from law 
clerks. Yet both are often criticized for usurping the role of Justices in 
deciding cases at the Supreme Courts.  
B. The Influences of Having Experienced Judges Serve as Justices’ 
Research Assistants 
Most Justices seem to appreciate the experience that research judges 
have shown in supporting the Justices.
82
 Nevertheless, they, as a group, 
have a very strong tendency to uphold the status quo ante in the form of a 
vague understanding of the binding authority of precedent.
83
 The fact that 
it is part of their task to select ―hanrei,‖ 84  which judges believe are 
 
 
 82. See, e.g., ITO, supra note 58, at 149; ONO, supra note 7, at 56, 58; see also MASAMICHI 
OKUDA, FUNSO KAIKETSU TO KIHAN SOZO [DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND CREATING NORM] 7–8 (2009); 
KOICHI YAGUCHI, SAIKOSAI TO TOMONI [ALONG WITH THE SUPREME COURT] 133–34 (1993). 
 83. See ITOH, supra note 2, at 64. 
 84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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precedents and have binding quality,
85
 makes them more committed to 
―hanrei‖ and to the status quo ante than the rest of the legal profession.86  
Interviews of research judges made it apparent that all of them are very 
much aware of what the factual consequences of each decision would be 
had the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and affirmed or reversed the 
judgment below. This is an indication that the Supreme Court is still the 
final court of error even in the eyes of the members of the judiciary. It is 
inevitable that these judges will go through all available documents 
meticulously to make sure their memorandum is not missing a clue that 
something went wrong that would deprive the parties of a just result. One 
of the research judges mentioned intuition and a sixth sense nurtured 
during her trial experiences as necessary capacities for a research judge. In 
other words, although what they do looks very theoretical and academic, it 
is not really a job fit for an academic or a recent graduate with very little 
experience. 
These research judges also do not hide their interest in contributing to 
the formation of new ―case law‖ and in persuading Justices to accept their 
views. But Justices, especially those who are not from the judiciary, are 
strong-minded people to start with. Even if research judges try hard to 
persuade, their advice will fall on deaf ears unless Justices already are 
inclined to listen.
87
 It appears that research judges sometimes have a 
difficult time persuading Justices who are not from the judiciary. 
Research judges repeatedly emphasize that the Supreme Court is the 
court of last resort to correct wrongs and to accomplish justice. Some 
mentioned that because most cases challenge lower-court decisions based 
on the facts of each case, alleging as-applied challenges of 
unconstitutionality at the most, the status of ―hanrei‖ should be awarded to 
a very few important decisions. In spite of the fact that they are keen to 
contribute to the formation of new case law, they tend to minimize the 
policy-making function that this entails. My impression was that research 
judges would like to have substantial influence, if possible, in setting the 
future direction of law but prefer to do so incognito. It is not easy to state 
what their real influence is and whether it is greater than that of law clerks. 
My guess is that their real influence might not be as great as they try to 
 
 
 85. See NAKANO, supra note 2. 
 86. See supra note 75, discussing what Ono saw as precedent-centricism. 
 87. In a book they co-authored, Yamaguchi and Miyaji illustrate the jurisprudential changes 
taking place at the Supreme Court in the twenty-first century. These occur not by the change of heart 
by a sitting Justice or two but, by the change of membership at each petty bench. SUSUMU 
YAMAGUCHI & YU MIYAJI, SAIKOSAI NO ANTO: SHŌSŪ IKEN GA JIDAI WO KIRIHIRAKU [SECRET FEUDS 
WITHIN THE SUPREME COURT: MINORITY OPINIONS ARE CHANGING THE WORLD] (2011). 
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portray and is probably smaller than that of law clerks because of their 
limited future options.  
C. Criticisms of “Chōsakan saiban” (Adjudication by Research Judges) 
The Supreme Court has been subject to criticism that its adjudication 
process is being taken over by research judges because Justices rely too 
much on research judges. It is known that Justices do not read all relevant 
documents and that research judges present Justices with not just 
memoranda of cases but preferable outcomes and draft judgments. 
Justices candidly admit that they do not have time to read all relevant 
documents sent to the Supreme Court
88
 and have to rely heavily on 
research judges in writing opinions.
89
 They are also aware that too much 
reliance would threaten the independence and subjectivity of their minds.
90
 
Thus, it is hard to believe that Justices accept, or rather swallow, all of the 
research judges’ memoranda and recommendations, warts and all.  
A more plausible concern is that because research judges are bright, 
diligent, and trustworthy as lawyers, research judges’ recommendations 
are very persuasive and actually have enormous influence in Justices’ 
understanding of cases. A research judge prepares a memorandum for each 
case before receiving any instruction from a presiding Justice, which gives 
some ground for the suspicion that research judges could easily dictate the 
outcome of cases by selecting the information that the Justices will read. 
Because the selection of information is the basis of well-informed decision 
making, it is sometimes crucial to the final outcome. Therefore, it is 
undeniably true that research judges could and would have a very large 
influence upon how each Justice would understand a case based upon a 
research judge’s memorandum. A Justice could ask the research judge for 
additional research, but since Justices do not have their own personal 
research assistants, they might not be aware of the need to do so. The 
collaborative working atmosphere within the chambers mentioned above 
forces research judges to view a case from various perspectives and to 
check the validity of their own memorandum, preventing it from becoming 
too self-content or self-righteous. There is no denying the fact that 
research judges honor previously decided cases, especially those of the 
Supreme Court, and tend to present a fairly static view of the world, 
 
 
 88. See, e.g., ONO, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
 89. See, e.g., ITO, supra note 58, at 149–50. 
 90. See, e.g., ONO, supra note 7, at 57. 
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recommending the status quo ante.
91
 Needless to say, Justices themselves 
are coming to the Supreme Court with substantial experience as judges, 
practitioners, prosecutors, administrators, and academics and can count on 
their own expertise to check the adequacy of any memorandum being 
presented to them. 
Another concern is that the recommendations of research judges are 
used as the first draft of the opinion of the Court. This phenomenon could 
mean the ultimate delegation of decision making to a research judge by a 
presiding Justice. But Justices indicate that, unless cases are not 
conference worthy or considered suitable for conference by circulation,
92
 
their deliberation in the conference rooms is very active, thorough, and 
meaningful.
93
 This would make it rather difficult for the final product, the 
opinion of the Court, not to reflect the contents of that deliberation. 
Nevertheless, these opinions are known to be bland and characterless, 
which raises the suspicion that they are actually written not by the Justices 
themselves but by research judges. There is one apparent difference. 
Unlike the majority opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
the majority opinions of the Japanese Supreme Court do not indicate the 
person who penned it by name. The assumption is that the presiding 
Justice is probably the author, but one can never be sure. In contrast, the 
minority opinions indicate who wrote each of them. They are more 
interesting because they more or less reveal Justices’ jurisprudence in 
livelier ways. This reinforces the suspicion that majority opinions are the 
work product of research judges. Furthermore, research judges not only 
present memorandum of the case but also a recommended outcome, and 
are quite often asked to prepare the first draft of the opinion. It is easy to 
conclude from this that majority opinions are written by research judges, 
and Justices go through them with red pens in their hand, checking dots 
for ―i’s‖ and dashes for ―t’s‖ but never totally rewriting them.  
Justices explain that it is the responsibility of the presiding Justice to go 
through the initial draft carefully before presenting it at the conference.
94
 
The initial drafts are often rewritten to reflect the deliberation at the 
conference to the extent that, often, it is not easy to recall the original 
wording or structure.
95
 The bland wordings reflect not a single Justice’s 
 
 
 91. Ono considers this feature inevitable as a supporting organ. See ONO, supra note 7, at 58. 
 92. A presiding Justice may circulate a case report and its recommended disposition to all the 
other Justices of the same petty bench. If all the other Justices agree, the case is disposed of without 
being discussed at Justices’ conference. See supra note 46. 
 93. See, e.g., OKUDA, supra note 82, at 8. 
 94. TAKII, supra note 7, at 30. 
 95. Id. at 30, 61. 
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opinion but the conclusion and common factors finally agreed on at the 
Justices’ conference.96 
There is no evidence, except for some writings by the Justices 
themselves, to show that the final opinions are more different from the 
first draft than is often assumed.
97
 The Justices’ assertions that the 
opinions are different from research judges’ drafts might not be sufficient 
to completely negate the accusation that Justices are rubber stamps. 
Because data are not available to the public, many people outside of the 
Supreme Court believe that, except in few difficult cases, Justices tend to 
rely upon and make extensive use of first drafts in producing majority 
opinions. 
In my view, majority opinions tend to be bland because they hope to 
garner as many supporting Justices as possible. In order to make the 
opinion acceptable and palatable to many, the writer would rather erase 
strongly worded phrases or interesting metaphors so as not to alienate 
tentatively interested Justices. The result consists of blandly worded 
compromises,
98
 written in the least offensive manner. Of course, this 
theory does not negate the possibility that research judges are the actual 
authors writing on behalf of the majority of Justices. 
III. THE FUTURE 
All Justices agree that research judges are indispensable because of the 
caseload at the Supreme Court and the amount of work necessary for the 
thorough preparation required before adjudicating any serious case (i.e., 
checking facts, relevant cases, and applicable theories) and because the 
Supreme Court is expected to do so many difficult things: interpret the 
Constitution, unify statutory interpretations and legal doctrines, correct 
errors which occurred in courts below, and administer justice. Research 
 
 
 96. In all Supreme Court decisions that have been published or made public by commercial 
publications, no presiding Justice has written a minority opinion that bears his name. 
 97. Takii emphasizes that drafts are drafts, that the final choice lies in the hands of the Justices, 
and that the final opinions always reflect the Justices’ judgments. Id. at 34. Yamaguchi and Miyaji 
recount a case where Justice Takii, while the presiding Justice, was in the minority and was not willing 
to endorse the majority opinion. Apparently, the research judge assigned to the case did not assume the 
task of writing the opinion of the Court. The publication of a minority opinion by a presiding Justice 
was eventually avoided when Takii retired in 2006. YAMAGUCHI & MIYAJI, supra note 87, at 78. It is 
hard to believe that not a single presiding Justice took a minority position within a single petty bench 
since the Court was established in 1947. One could think that Takii’s intent to publish his minority 
opinion was side-stepped by a research judge’s delaying tactics. 
 98. Takii believes that opinions often lack persuasiveness because they are the result of 
compromise. TAKII, supra note 7, at 61. 
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judges as an institution are well established and here to stay with the 
Supreme Court. 
Justice Takii suggests that a Justice should nominate her own research 
assistants.
99
 The sentiment might be based on the experience of the 
phantom dissent that Yamaguchi and Miyaji refer to.
100
 The obstacles are 
many: newly appointed Justices, unless they had been at the Secretariat for 
a long time, would not know many judges on which they would personally 
want to rely as their own research assistants; it would be very hard for 
practitioners to leave lucrative private practice on short notice to become a 
research assistant;
101
 it is not enough to know just the doctrinal aspects of 
legal arguments to function well as a research judge; and, in any case, the 
person must be a brilliant lawyer who could deal with any subject matter, 
unlike present research judges who have their own specialized fields of 
expertise. Justice Ono admits it is probably impossible to find someone 
who fits the bill.
102
 Thus, introducing something in Japan similar to 
American law clerks does not appear to be on the horizon. 
Now that all Supreme Court Justices in the United States have clerked, 
would that also be an expected feature of future Justices appointed from 
the judiciary? It is true that almost all of the recent chief and senior 
research judges eventually end up at the Supreme Court. It also is true that 
those who were section chiefs and directors at the Secretariat also end up 
at the Supreme Court. A judge who had been at the Secretariat or was a 
research judge is very likely to be appointed as a Justice, but there could 
always be some exceptions. 
This paper is based on some interviews with research judges, past and 
present. But I did not have access to any documents detailing the inner 
workings of the Supreme Court, such as conference memoranda or 
personal papers left by individual Justices. We will all benefit when 
students of the Supreme Court can base their hypotheses on real evidence, 
rather than some anecdotes that a researcher was able to gather. A new 
 
 
 99. Id. at 33. 
 100. According to Yamaguchi & Miyaji, Takii was unable to present his minority opinion because 
he was the presiding Justice for the case. YAMAGUCHI & MIYAJI, supra note 87. 
 101. Practitioners are asked a couple of years ahead of time whether they are interested in being a 
candidate. Some decline at this point; others go through several steps of the selection process, first 
through the local bar association, and then through the FJBA, before the FJBA finally presents a short 
list, usually of three people, to the Supreme Court. When short-listed, most practitioners are said to 
subtly ask other practitioners to take over active cases. Some start to decline taking new cases unless 
there is a sufficiently large group of lawyers involved to minimize the impact of his or her absence. 
For academics and others, the notice comes rather suddenly with almost no time for preparation.  
 102. ONO, supra note 7, at 59. 
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Freedom of Information Act
103
 will be proposed, and the Public Records 
Management Act
104
 will come into effect in April 2011. But neither statute 
applies directly to the judiciary. Our hope for a better understanding of the 
judiciary rests upon more, accurate information concerning courts, judges, 
and their inner-working system, coming directly from the judiciary on 
their own initiative. Unless we have better access to information on 
research judges, their portraits will be much, much larger than life, and we 
will have to guess at what is left behind the curtain. 
 
 
 103. The statute in force is Gyosei kikan no hoyu suru joho no kokai ni kansuru horitsu [Freedom 
of Government-owned Information Act], Law No. 42 of 1999. After a decade of hiatus, the 
Government is said to be presenting a new bill this ―January to June 2011‖ session of the Diet. 
 104. Kobunsho to no kanri ni kansuru horitsu [Public Records Management Act], Law No. 66 of 
2009. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/10
  
 
 
 
 
2011] CHŌSAKAN 1627 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
CHIEF RESEARCH JUDGES SINCE 1968 
 Chief Research Judge Justice 
SAITO, Toshio December 1968 to 
February 1970 
 
YASUMURA, Kazuo February 1970 to 
October 1971 
 
NAKAMURA, Jiro October 1971 to  
July 1976 
September 1978 to 
February 1984 
OGATA, Setsuo July 1976 to  
March 1977 
 
NISHIMURA, Koichi March 1977 to  
May 1982 
 
IGUCHI, Makiro May 1982 to  
February 1984 
 
KABE, Tsuneo February 1984 to  
May 1987 
May 1990 to  
March 1997 
MIYOSHI, Toru May 1987 to  
May 1990 
March 1992 to 
October 1997 
KITAGAWA, Hiroharu May 1990 to 
December 1994 
September 1998 to 
December 2004 
UEDA, Toyozo December 1994 to 
March 1998 
February 2002 to 
May 2007 
IMAI, Isao March 1998 to 
February 2002 
December 2004 to 
December 2009 
KONDO, Takaharu February 2002 to 
December 2005 
May 2007 to  
present 
CHIBA, Katsumi December 2005 to 
November 2008 
December 2009 to 
present 
NAGAI, Toshio November 2008 to 
present 
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HEADS OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1947 
 Director Justice 
HONMA, Yoshikazu August 1947 to  
June 1950 
 
GOKIJO, Kakiwa June 1950 to  
March 1958 
August 1961 to 
December 1966 
YOKOTA, Masatoshi March 1958 to  
May 1960 
February 1962 to 
August 1966; 
Chief Justice,  
August 1966 to 
January 1969 
ISHIDA, Kazuto May 1960 to  
March 1962 
June 1963 to  
January 1969; 
Chief Justice, 
January 1969 to  
May 1973 
SHIMOMURA, Saburo March 1962 to  
June 1963 
 
SEKINE, Kosato July 1963 to  
June 1965 
January 1969 to 
December 1975 
KISHI, Seiichi June 1965 to  
July 1970 
April 1971 to  
June 1978 
YOSHIDA, Yutaka July 1970 to  
February 1973 
May 1973 to 
February 1979 
YASUMURA, Kazuo February 1973 to 
December 1974 
 
TERADA, Jiro December 1974 to 
November 1977 
March 1980 to 
September 1982; 
Chief Justice, 
October 1982 to 
November 1985 
MAKI, Keiji November 1977 to 
March 1980 
May 1982 to 
November 1989 
YAGUCHI, Koichi March 1980 to 
November 1982 
February 1984 to 
November 1985; 
Chief Justice, 
November 1985 to 
February 1990 
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 Director Justice 
KATSUMI, Yoshimi November 1982 to 
January 1986 
 
KUSABA, Ryohachi January 1986 to 
February 1988 
November 1989 to 
February 1990;  
Chief Justice, 
February 1990 to  
November 1995 
ONISHI, Katsuya February 1988 to 
November 1989 
May 1991 to 
September 1998 
KAWASAKI, Yoshinori November 1989 to 
February 1992 
 
CHIGUSA, Hideo February 1992 to 
September 1993 
September 1993 to 
February 2002 
KANATANI, Toshihiro September 1993 to 
November 1996 
October 1997 to  
May 2005 
IZUMI, Tokuji November 1996 to 
March 2000 
November 2002 to 
January 2009 
HORIGOME, Yukio March 2000 to 
November 2002 
May 2005 to  
June 2010 
TAKEZAKI, Hironobu November 2002 to 
June 2006 
Chief Justice, 
November 2008 to 
present 
OTANI, Takehiko June 2006 to  
January 2009 
June 2010 to  
present 
YAMAZAKI, Toshimitsu January 2009 to 
present 
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